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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Rio.iuw J. Fos m*
EVIDENCE
Attorneys who are engaged in establishing medical causation
in compensation cases have constantly been confronted with the
understandable reluctance of medical witnesses to use the phrase
"most likely" or "most probably" when there are other medical
possibilities. Medicine is not an exact science and frequently
cases that should be compensable do involve other medical pos-
sibilities. In Grice v. Dickerson, Inc.1 the court declared that
where the testimony of medical experts is not solely relied upon
to establish causal connection, the medical expert testimony is
sufficient if it establishes that a conclusion of causal connection
does not involve entry into the field of conjecture.
In this case the claimant suffered an admitted compensable
injury resulting in a hernia. Following the hernia operation, for
which compensation was paid, the claimant developed rheuma-
toid arthritis. The medical testimony established that rheumatoid
arthritis could be caused by a number of factors and that, of
the possibilities, two of them were the stress of a surgical opera-
tion and a traumatic injury, both of which were present in the
case. Further medical testimony was offered to show that the
possibility of a connection between the operation and arthritis
was strengthened by an early onset of the disease. The doctors
gave as their opinion that medical science has not discovered the
exact cause of rheumatoid arthritis, and none of the medical
testimony established probable cause or causal connection be-
tween the operation and the condition of the claimant.
The court held that even though there was no medical testi-
mony that the arthritis was "most probably" caused by the claim-
ant's injury and subsequent operation, the medical testimony
definitely recognized the possibility of the causal connection
between them in the light of the facts of the case. Under such
circumstances it became the duty of the Commission to weigh the
facts in the light of medical possibilities.
Here, reliance was not upon medical testimony alone to show
causal connection between the injury and the subsequent dis-
ability of the claimant, but rather in addition upon the cir-
* Attorney at Law, Greenville, S. C.
1. 241 S.C. 225, 127 S.E.2d 722 (1962). This case is also noted in the Ad-
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cumstances surrounding the injury and the events which
followed. The medical testimony was not relied upon to show
causal connection, but to show that, from the other facts and
circumstances, a conclusion of causal connection did not in-
volve entry into the field of conjecture, surmise and specula-
tion. The Commission was faced with the duty to choose
among two or more causative factors. The uncertainty of
the medical testimony was sufficiently substantiated by the
sequence of events which followed the injury.
Consistent with this decision, the court in Gosnell v. BRyantV
found the combination of lay testimony and the absence of suffi-
cient expert medical testimony insufficient to establish that the
alleged disability of the claimant "most probably" resulted from
the injury. As a result the court correctly sustained the defend-
ant's position that compensation should be denied.
In Randolph . Fiske-Oarter,4 the court reaffirmed the rule
that the general practitioner is qualified to testify as an expert.
In that case the court quoted with approval the rule as stated in
Hill v. Carolina Power 6 Light Co.5 :
a physician or surgeon is not incompetent to testify as an
expert merely because he is not a specialist in the particular
branch of his profession involved in the case. The fact, how-
ever, that the witness is not a specialist in the particular
branch of the profession involved may be considered as
affecting the weight of his testimony, but this is no ground
for completely rejecting it.6
JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION
The principle of inclusion rather than exclusion is the general
rule used in determining the jurisdiction of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Commission. This, however, is to be distinguished from
the error of "finding a fact upon a doubt" as set out in AZlen v.
Phinney Oil Go.7 The claimant here was employed by Phinney
who operated a business in his individual capacity. Later Phin-
2. Id. at 230, 127 S.E.2d at 725.
3. 240 S.C. 215, 125 S.E.2d 405 (1962). This case is also noted in the Ad-
ministrative Law section at notes 65 and 79.
4. 240 S.C. 182, 125 S.E.2d 267 (1962). This case is also noted in the Ad-
ministrative Law section at note 75.
5. 204 S.C. 83, 28 S.E.2d 545 (1943).
6. Id. at 109, 28 S.E.2d at 555.
7. 241 S.C. 173, 127 S.E.2d 448 (1962). This case is also noted in the Ad-
ministrative Law section at note 82.
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ney and a Mr. Bruce formed a corporation of which Phinney
owned thirty per cent of the stock. This corporation operated
under the Compensation Act. The circuit court reversed the
Industrial Commission, finding that at no time was the claim-
ant an employee of the corporation and denied any benefits for
his death. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and rein-
stated the award of the Industrial Commission. The court cited
the general rule that: "'the basic purpose of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act is inclusion of employers and employees within
its coverage and not their exclusion, and doubts of jurisdiction
will be resolved in favor of inclusion rather than exclusion.""
However, the court pointed out there was no conflict between
this principle and the refusal to extend the principle of liberal
construction to the finding of a fact upon doubt rather than evi-
dence, stating,
There is no sound reason for the translation of the rule of
liberal construction of the law to the finding of the facts
to the end that doubt with respect to the latter shall be re-
solved in the favor of the claimant. Doubt as a foundation
of a factual finding, can hardly be distinguished from sur-
mise, speculation and conjecture which countless cases have
condemned as a substitute for facts and legitimate infer-
ences. Conviction, not doubt, is a proper basis of a conclusion
of fact.9
In MacMullen v. South Oarolina Mee. & Gas Co.1° the im-
portance of decisions determining jurisdiction of the Commission
was further illustrated in the reversal by the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals of a seventy-five thousand dollar district court
award. The court held that the appellant electric company was
engaged in a part of its "trade, business or occupation" while
constructing a steam generating plant; and, therefore, the plain-
tiff, or injured employee of the sub-contractor, was required to
seek his remedy under the Compensation Act.
After a detailed review of the facts in which the court ob-
served that the defendant's employees had been engaged con-
tinuously in construction of new power generating facilities
since 1949, the court stated that the purpose of the act "would
be defeated to hold the act applicable only to maintenance and
8. Id. at 180, 127 S.E.2d at 452.
9. Ibid.
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repair and to exempt the employer in the more important field
of new construction." 11
ACCIDENTAL INJURY
The claimant in Lee v. Wentworth Mfg. Co. 12 became disabled
as a result of an infection following a tuberculin test that was
administered to her during working hours and in accordance
with an agreement between the employer and the claimant's
union. The court held that the test was administered for the
mutual benefit of the employer and the employee and was there-
fore properly held to be incidental to her employment.
In Jake v. Jones' the evidence established that the deceased
lost his life by drowning during normal working hours on the
property controlled by the employer and at a place where his
duties required him to be. The court found that a presumption
arose that the death of the employee resulted as a consequence
of his employment and the award for compensation was af-
firmed.
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
In Brittle v. Raybestos-fanliattan, Ino.14 the deceased em-
ployee was totally disabled as a result of the occupational disease
of asbestosis prior to his death. In the claim arising from his
death, the medical board, appointed on motion of the employer,
determined that the employee had died as a result of two dis-
eases, the asbestosis of long standing and pulmonary cancer. The
asbestosis was held eighty-five per cent responsible for his death
and the cancer fifteen per cent responsible. Thereafter, the Com-
mission awarded the full amount of the statutory death benefits.
The employer contended that where the death of the employee
was caused by an occupational disease and a noncompensable
infirmity, the award from the death benefits should be reduced
by the percentage which the non-compensable infirmity was
determined to have contributed to the employee's death. The
South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act provides that
compensation payable for disability or death "shall be computed
11. Id. at 666.
12. 240 S.C. 165, 125 S.E.2d 7 (1962). This case is also noted in the Ad-
ministrative Law section at note 68.
13. 240 S.C. 574, 126 S.E.2d 721 (1962). This case is also noted in the Ad-
ministrative Law section at notes 69 and 81.
14. 241 S.C. 255, 127 S.E.2d 884 (1962). This case is also noted in the Ad-
ministrative Law section at note 70.
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by the proportion which the disability from the occupational
disease bears to the entire disability."' 5 The Supreme Court
held against the defendant's construction of the section and de-
cided that "the factor determining the amount of death benefit,
where death is caused by an occupational disease and a non-
compensable infirmity, is the relation in proportion which the
disability from the occupational disease bears to the entire dis-
ability and not the proportion which such occupational disability
bears to the cause of the death."' 0
In this case it was undisputed that the employee was totally
disabled from the disease of asbestosis. This being true, although
there were other factors, any one of which may have rendered
the employee totally disabled, there should be no reduction in
the death benefits.
It is interesting also in this case that voluntary payments were
made by the employer in the amount of $100.00 per month. The
total sum amounted to $6,820.00. The employer claimed credit
for this payment, which was denied. The court cited with ap-
proval the rule as stated in Larson's Workmen's Compensation
Law that: "The credit rule has been applied only when the wages
paid were at least equal to the compensation that was due for
the week. This can easily be defended under the intention rule,
since the employer can not be ascribed an intention to make
certain payments in lieu of compensation when the payments
are too small to be compensation benefits."17
In Drake v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.'8 the court, although
approving the remand of the case to the Industrial Commission
for further findings of fact, defined the rule determining the
limitation period for giving notice under the occupational dis-
ease section of the act. In this case the employee was discharged
in March, 1954, and about four years later filed her claim for
compensation benefits. The defendant contended that timely
notice of her claim was not given as required by the compensa-
tion law. In discussing the law governing notice under occupa-
tional diseases statutes, the court stated:
The date of the accrual of compensability does not neces-
sarily establish the date when the statute of limitations for
the giving of notice or the filing of a claim begins to run
15. S.C. CODE § 72-258 (1962).
16. 241 S.C. 255 at 261, 127 S.E.2d at 887.
17. 2 LARsON, LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 24 (1961).
18. 241 S.C. 116, 127 S.E.2d 288 (1962). This case is also noted in the Ad-
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in such cases. While our statutes, Sections 72-301 and 72-
303, date the running of the limitation period from the
accident, such term as used in reference to occupational dis-
eases means, as we have pointed out above, disregard disable-
ment from such diseases and, in case of a pulmonary disease,
as here involved, total disability. In determining the occur-
rence of disability in occupational disease cases we are deal-
ing usually with a period of time over which the disease
progresses to the point of disablement. An employee may
contract a disease from exposure in his employment and for
a long time afterward not know that he has it. Usually diag-
nosis can only be made by a physician and diagnosis, even
by a physician, in many instances, is most difficult and de-
layed. It is because of this latent character of the disease and
the inability of the employee to diagnose and appreciate the
nature and character of his illness that many courts have
adopted the rule that limitation periods prescribed in Work-
men's Compensation Acts, in occupational disease cases, for
notice to the employer and for the filing of a claim for com-
pensation, begin to run when the disease has culminated in
disability and when the claimant by reasonable diligence
could have discovered that his condition was a compensable
one.19
Therefore, the South Carolina rule as to determining the be-
ginning of the running of the period of limitations in cases
involving occupational diseases is one in keeping with the ma-
jority of jurisdictions. It is the time when the disease has cul-
minated in disability and when the claimant by use of reasonable
diligence could have discovered that he had a compensable claim.
19. Id. at 122, 127 S.E2d at 291.
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